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Abstract
To evaluate the impact of mass vaccination with adjuvanted vaccines (eventually 40% population coverage) and antivirals
during the 2009 influenza pandemic in Norway, we fitted an age-structured SEIR model using data on vaccinations and sales
of antivirals in 2009/10 in Norway to Norwegian ILI surveillance data from 5 October 2009 to 4 January 2010. We estimate a
clinical attack rate of approximately 30% (28.7–29.8%), with highest disease rates among children 0–14 years (43–44%).
Vaccination started in week 43 and came too late to have a strong influence on the pandemic in Norway. Our results
indicate that the countermeasures prevented approximately 11–12% of potential cases relative to an unmitigated
pandemic. Vaccination was found responsible for roughly 3 in 4 of the avoided infections. An estimated 50% reduction in
the clinical attack rate would have resulted from vaccination alone, had the campaign started 6 weeks earlier. Had
vaccination been prioritized for children first, the intervention should have commenced approximately 5 weeks earlier in
order to achieve the same 50% reduction. In comparison, we estimate that a non-adjuvanted vaccination program should
have started 8 weeks earlier to lower the clinical attack rate by 50%. In conclusion, vaccination timing was a critical factor in
relation to the spread of the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza. Our results also corroborate the central role of children for the
transmission of A(H1N1) pandemic influenza.
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Introduction
The novel A(H1N1) influenza virus, that was identified from an
epidemic in Mexico in March 2009, rapidly spread throughout the
world and was declared a pandemic (Phase 6) by the WHO on
June 11 2009. It became clear at an early stage that the pandemic
was relatively mild with considerable immunity against the virus in
older people [1]. However, the pandemic was distinct from
seasonal influenza as young people and people without any
predisposing underlying disease were disproportionately affected
in terms of hospitalizations and deaths, and intensive care units
were pressured by cases of acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS) [2]. Serological and clinical studies indicate that a larger
proportion of infections were asymptomatic or mild compared to
interpandemic influenza [3,4].
In Europe, the major pandemic wave hit in October to
December, in some countries it arrived following a minor summer
wave. The 2009 A (H1N1) pandemic was the first pandemic where
antivirals and vaccines were available and it is therefore of great
interest to evaluate the effectiveness of these intervention
measures. The intervention strategies and national plans for
pandemic influenza differed among countries and there was
heterogeneity in the severity and timing of the pandemic across the
region. Norway holds an extensive list of population based
registries including a vaccine registry and a prescription registry
based on person numbers (unique person identifiers). Norwegian
public health authorities had made an agreement of advance
purchase of 9.4 million doses of the adjuvanted vaccine
PandemrixH (Glaxo Smith Kline Biologicals s.a.) in the event of
a pandemic. The purchase was later downsized to 6.4 million
doses and amounted to 112 million USD (January 2010). The
contract secured that Norway would receive the first vaccine
produced, and delivery of Pandemrix commenced in October in
the midst of the influenza pandemic. The vast majority of
vaccinations were carried out between October and December,
and data from the vaccine registry show that 1.95 million persons
were vaccinated, corresponding to 40% of the population. In
addition, some 0.2–0.3 million persons were vaccinated without
being registered [5].
Since 2005 , Norway had stockpiled 1.4 million treatment
courses of the antiviral TamifluH (Roche) and 0.2 million
treatment courses of RelenzaH(GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals s.a.)
due to fear of a bird flu pandemic, in accordance with WHO
recommendations. Norway, together with UK, had a liberal policy
regarding the use of antivirals, while most countries restricted the
prescription of antivirals to doctors only. During the pandemic,
Norwegian pharmacists were allowed the temporary right to issue
prescriptions of antivirals to ease pressure on health care services.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30018We estimate the effectiveness of vaccination and antivirals in
mitigating the 2009 A(H1N1) influenza in Norway. To this
purpose, we developed an age-structured dynamic model that was
fitted to surveillance data. The model was used to perform
contrafactual simulations to estimate the disease burden of an
unmitigated pandemic and also to study the influence of
vaccination timing and strategy on the disease burden.
Methods
1. Data
Data from the Norwegian general practitioner (GP) sentinel
network was obtained from the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health (NIPH). The sentinel network consists of about 200 GPs
throughout the country, covering around 15% of the population.
During the winter season, from week 40 to week 20, the sentinel
GPs report weekly on the proportion of their patient contacts that
are given the diagnosis of influenza-like illness (ILI) based on
symptoms such as abrupt onset of fever accompanied by
respiratory signs and muscle pain. Since 1999 the ILI surveillance
is stratified in four age groups: 0–4 years, 5–14 years, 15–64 years
and 65+years. In 2009 the surveillance was extended to cover the
summer period due to the emerging pandemic.
We obtained age-specific data on the pandemic vaccine
coverage from week 43/2009 through week 9/2010 from the
Norwegian National Vaccine Registry (SYSVAK). Doctors and
nurses were required to register pandemic vaccination by person
number and date of vaccination. We used data on purchased
antivirals, TamifluH and RelenzaH from 1 January to 31
December 2009 from the Norwegian Prescription Database
(NorPD) containing information on all delivery of medicine in
Norway from pharmacies with person identification number and
date. Both TamifluH and RelenzaH are prescription-only prepa-
rations in Norway. We stratified data on use of vaccine and
antivirals into 3 age groups: 0–14 years, 15–64 years and 65+ years
in accordance with the ILI surveillance data.
2. Influenza Model
We used an SEIR (Susceptible - Exposed (latent) - Infective - Removed)
transmission model with age groups, staged latent and infective
periods and additional states for symptoms , vaccination and
antiviral treatment status to simulate the dynamics of the 2009 A
(H1N1) influenza pandemic (see Figure 1) . In this section we
describe the basic structure and parameterization of the model.
Details of the model structure and parameterization related to
antivirals and vaccination are described in the corresponding
sections below. We considered a closed population of size
N=4.868 million, consistent with the Norwegian population in
January 2010, divided into sub-populations of children 0–14 years
(18,9%), adults 15–64 years (66,4%) and elderly 65+years (14,7%).
For the age groups a=1, 2, 3, the Infective class was subdivided
into symptomatic infected (IS(a)) and asymptomatic infected (IA(a)).
We employed a WAIFW matrix (‘‘Who-acquires-infection-
from-whom’’ matrix) based on the relative contact rates between
age groups using empirical contact data from a European study
[6]. School-children were considered to have distinct susceptibility
(susc) and infectivity (infc) to influenza to account for potential
higher transmissibility in this age group compared to the general
population. These parameters, as well as the effective reproductive
number R, were estimated during the model fitting procedure.
The effective reproductive number of the disease was calculated as
the largest eigenvalue of the next generation matrix incorporating
all assumptions about exposed and infectious stages in the model
[7].
To obtain realistic representations of the exposed and infectious
periods, we divided these periods into ni stages (i~ E or I), where
the progression from each stage occurs at rate ri~ni=Di, where Di
is the average duration of period i. This results in gamma
distributed sojourn times with shape parameters k~ni and scale
parameters h~Di=ni. The mean duration of the exposed
(incubation) period was set to 1.9 days [8,9], and modeled in
nE~3 stages. Individuals in the last exposed stage were assumed to
be infectious with infectivity 25% compared to full infectivity of
symptomatic infections, as viral shedding of influenza increases
during the first day following transmission [10]. We further
assumed that the proportions pS(1)~0:65 of children and
p(i)~0:55, i~2, 3 of adults and elderly would develop symptom-
atic infection [11]. Symptomatic infection was modeled with a
mean duration of 5 days with nIS~5 stages. The infectivity in the
stages was assumed to be 100%, 100%, 50%, 50% and 25% to
give a reasonable infectivity profile in agreement with empirical
data showing that viral influenza shedding peaks during the early
period after symptoms develop [10]. We set the average duration
of the remaining (1{pS(i)) asymptomatic infections to 5 days
modeled in nIA~4 stages. The peak infectivity of asymptomatic
infections was assumed to be 50% of the peak level of a
symptomatic infection [12], and with 100%, 100%, 50% and
25%, infectivity in the stages, respectively. All infected individuals
were assumed to be protected against re-infection during the
course of the simulation.
Norwegian sera collected in August 2009 showed low
prevalence (3.2%; HI§40) of protective antibodies reactive to
the 2009 A (H1N1) influenza, which was similar to the pre-
pandemic August 2008 levels [13], and we assumed that all
children and adults were susceptible to A(H1N1) pandemic
influenza at the start of the simulation. Guided by preliminary
simulations, we assumed that 60% of the elderly population had
pre-existing humoral immunity against the 2009 pandemic
influenza. This estimate is somewhat high compared to Norwegian
seroprevalence data, but in line with data from Finland showing
that 96% of people born between 1909 and 1919, and 77% to
14% of people born between 1920 and 1944 had pre-existing
antibodies against the 2009 A (H1N1) influenza [14].
The simulations were performed in Matlab R2010 using the
ode45 solver with daily output. On the first day of the simulation a
single infected individual in each age group was introduced into all
three age groups. The final epidemic size was evaluated by the end
of week 3 in 2010 for the fitted models, and by the end of week 12
in scenarios addressing vaccination timing.
3. Antivirals
To model the effect of antivirals, we assumed that an overall
proportion puse of purchased antivirals were used by people for
whom antiviral treatment was intended, and that all individuals in
this group followed the recommended treatment schedules. We
assumed that a proportion pp of the antivirals were used for
prophylaxis, while the remaining proportion pt~(1{pp) was used
for treatment by symptomatic infected individuals. The parame-
ters puse and pp were considered to be constant and age-
independent during the course of the pandemic.
A Norwegian population-based internet study among people
aged 18–67 years found that 37% (46/123) of people who bought
antivirals in the period November 2009 to June 2010 did this with
the purpose of private stockpiling [15]. During the major wave,
50–70% of the laboratory tests were positive for influenza [16],
and we used this number as a proxy for the proportion of people
using antiviral drugs for treatment, who actually experienced an
influenza infection. Based on these figures, we made a rough
Countermeasures against A(H1N1) in Norway
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(being approximately equal to (120.37)|0.6). The use of
antivirals for prophylaxis was limited and mainly allocated to
high-risk healthcare workers and emergency services personnel at
hospitals who had failed to use recommended personal protective
equipment [17], and we thus assumed that pp varied between
0.025 and 0.055.
Susceptible individuals S(a) initiating antiviral treatment were
moved to states of temporary antiviral protection A(a);t h em e a n
duration of protection was set to 10 days in accordance with
prophylaxis treatment guidelines [18]. The antiviral efficacy for
susceptibility (ability to prevent infection) was assumed to be
AEsus~0:70, for infectiousness (ability to reduce transmission)
AEi~0:15, and for pathogenicity (ability to reduce symptoms
conditional on infection) AEp~0:60, based on data from
household studies [19,20]. The exposed and infective compart-
ments E (a),I 
S(a),I 
A(a) for people undergoing chemoprophylaxis
were modeled with similar infectivity profile and number of stages
as those used for untreated groups (Table 1), except that the
mean duration of the infectious period for people undergoing
treatment was reduced by 1 day, following suggestions by Longini
et al. [12].
According to national guidelines, use of antivirals for treatment
of clinical influenza should be initiated within 48 hours after
symptoms emerge [18]. We modeled this effect by moving
symptomatic infected people starting antiviral treatment IS(a) to
the less infectious I 
A(a) compartments after a mean duration of
24 hours from symptoms emerged (i.e. following the first stage of
infection, see Figure 1). The mean duration of the infectious period
for this group was assumed to be reduced by 1 day.
4. Vaccination
We assumed vaccines to be randomly distributed within each
age group. A study among Norwegian health care workers shows
that vaccination with adjuvanted A(H1N1) pandemic vaccine
elicited a rapid and strong response with 78% and 98% of the
vaccinees being protected (HI titres §40) after 7 and 14 days,
respectively [21]. In the model, vaccinated susceptible individuals
were moved to states of vaccine protection V(a) following a time
delay of Tv~7 days. Specifically, at time tzTv we moved
r(a,t)Nv(a,t) individuals to the vaccinated states, where r(a,t) is
the density of susceptible individuals in age group a and Nv(a,t) is
the number of registered vaccinated individuals at time t. Due to
the delay of vaccine effect, we did not consider effects of
vaccination among exposed or infected individuals. Results from
clinical trials assessing the PandemrixH vaccine have shown
immune response rates close to 100% among adults and children
[22], in line with the 98% response rate in the Norwegian study
[21]. However, other published studies report a lower vaccine
efficacy, and the vaccine efficacy against infection was therefore set
to VEsus~0:80 for individuals ,65 years, and VEsus~0:55 for
people 65+ years. The vaccine efficacy for pathogenicity and
infectiousness was assumed to be VEp~0:60 and VEi~0:15. This
gives an overall efficacy against symptomatic disease of 0.92 for
people ,65 years, and 0.8 for people aged 65+ years, which is in
line with results from a German study showing a VE of 0.97 and
0.83 in these age groups against laboratory confirmed pandemic
infection [22], but higher than results of 0.78 in people ,65 years
obtained in a pan-European study [23].
We also tested the model with parameters representing a non-
adjuvanted influenza vaccine. In these simulations, we assumed
vaccine efficacy against infection to be VEsus~0:70 for people
,65 years and VEsus~0:55 for people 65+ years, and the time
delay Tv was extended by one week to 14 days [24].
5. Estimation of Reproductive Number from Initial
Growth Phase Data
The initial growth rate r of the weekly ILI data was estimated
assuming an exponentially growing epidemic in the weeks 41–44/
45. We performed a linear regression of the log-transformed ILI
rates and the model fit was evaluated in terms of coefficient of
determination. At least 3 weeks of ILI data were used in the
Figure 1. Schematics of the dynamic transmission model for influenza (shaded compartments), with vaccine and antiviral
intervention (unshaded).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g001
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include was selected based on the goodness of fit.
The data-based reproductive number R was estimated within a
simple SEIR framework assuming a latency period of 1.9 days and
a mean duration of infectivity of 4.3 days. The reproductive
number was calculated from [25]:
R~
rDI
rDE
m
z1
   m
1{
rDI
n
z1
   {n ð1:1Þ
where DE, DI are the mean durations and m, n the numbers of
stages of the exposed and infectious periods, respectively.
6. Model Fitting
We fitted the model by comparing the epidemic curve of the
model, i.e. the prevalence of clinical infections, Itot
S (a,t)~
IS(a,t)zI 
S(a,t), with data of the age-specific numbers of ILI
consultations. The model fitting was conducted on daily data from
the trough before the major wave (week 41) and the following 13
weeks until the beginning of 2011 (week 53). The comparison was
focused on the shape of the epidemic curve or, equivalently,
allowing for an undetermined constant of proportionality be-
tween number of ILI notifications and cases of influenza. The
proportionality was implemented by comparing the trans-
formed quantities ILIt(a,t)~ILI(a,t)=max(ILI) and It
S(a,t)~
Itot
S (a,t)
 
max(Itot
S ). The maxima refer to the overall maximum of
symptomatic infected and ILI consultations, respectively, over
age groups and time (in practice corresponding to the maximum
in the adult population). The model fitting procedure included
the following steps:
a) A first guess at the real time correspondence of time in the
modeled epidemic was made by fixing the time t~T  when
the density of clinical infections reached 3.5/1000 in the
model population as the first day in week 41. This level was
chosen based on preliminary simulations.
b) Nonlinear least squares was used to obtain estimates for the
parameters h~(susc,infc,R) that minimize:
RSS(h)~
X 3
a~1
X T z91
t~T 
ILIt(a,t){It
S(a,t;h)
   2 ð1:2Þ
c) Step b) was repeated for different choices of the real time
anchor within the interval t~T {7,:::,T z7. The final
model estimate was found by selecting the model in this set
with the minimum residual sum of squares.
The optimization was conducted using the lsqnonlin function in
the Optimization Toolbox in Matlab R2010.
7. Scenarios and Sensitivity Analyses
The data on purchased antivirals only provide indirect
information on the use of antivirals. In addition, immune
individuals may have taken the drugs for prophylaxis, and some
people under treatment may have stopped taking the drugs before
finishing the recommended treatment period. The parameter puse
is therefore a composite parameter, incorporating all effects acting
to reduce the overall effect of antivirals. Due to uncertainty on the
use of antivirals, we considered 3 different scenarios varying puse
between 25%, 37.5% and 50%.
We performed a probabilistic sensitivity analysis by drawing 500
random sets of parameters representing the time delay for vaccine
effect (Tv), the vaccine efficacy on susceptibility (VEs) and the
proportion of antivirals used for prophylaxis (pp) from the prior
distributions described in Table 1. The time delay for vaccine
Table 1. Model parameters with baseline values, range and
distributional assumptions for varied parameters{, and
estimated model parameters{ in the fitting procedure.
Fixed parameters Baseline value Range
Average duration of
exposed period 1=s
1.9 days (3 stages)
Average duration of
infectious period 1=c
Sympt. infected 5 days (5 stages)
Asympt. infected 4 days (4 stages)
Sympt.* infected 4 days (5 stages)
Asympt. infected 3 days (4 stages)
Relative infectiousness
Sympt. infected (inf_s) 1.0
Asympt. infected (inf_a) 0.5
Infectivity profile
Exposed 0,0,0.25
Sympt. infected 1.0,1.0,0.5,0.5,0.25
Asympt. infected 1.0,1.0.0.5,0.5
Sympt.* infected 1.0,1.0,0.5,0.5,0.25
Asympt.* infected 1.0,1.0,0.5,0.5
Antiviral/vaccine efficacy
infection AE_sus 0.65
sympt. infection VE_p, AE_p 0.60
infectiouness VE_i, AE_i 0.15
Varied parameters{
Proportion sympt.
infected, p_s
Beta distr.
(a=3;b=3)
1)
children 0.65 [0.60;0.80]
2)
adults,elderly 0.55 [0.5;0.7]
2)
Proportion of antivirals used p_use 0.375 0.25;0,0.5
Time delay vaccine effect T_v 7 days Gamma distr. ( b=1.5;
a=1;m=6d)
3)
Vaccine efficacy susceptibility,
VE_sus
Beta distr.
( a=3;b=3)
1)
,65 y 0.80 (m=0.7;n=0.9)
65+y 0.55 (m=0.45;b=65)
Prop. of antivirals prophylaxis p_p 0.04 Uniform; (0.025;0.055)
Estimated parameters{
Reproductive number
(effective) R
fitted
Relative infectivity of
children inf_c
fitted
Relative susceptibility of
children sus_c
fitted
1)pdf(y)~(y{m)
a{1(n{y)
b{1=B(a,b)(n{m)
azb{1.
2)A single beta distribution was used to generate random variates from baseline
values.
3)pdf(y)~(y{m)=b)
a{1 exp({(y{m)=b)=(bC(a)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.t001
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vaccine efficacy against laboratory confirmed infection varied
between 0.78–0.96. The model estimation procedurewas conduct-
ed for each set of parameters, and for each of the three scenarios
puse~25%, 37.5% and 50%.
Results
1. Epidemiology
Figure 2 shows the weekly reported ILI rates between April
2009 and March 2010. The first cases of laboratory confirmed
A(H1N1) infection were reported in early May, and continued
sporadic spread was observed in the early summer months with
few cases in children [13], possibly due to the summer school
vacation. In mid-July and August, the ILI activity increased in
Norway creating an early summer wave. It is believed that the
summer wave was mainly associated with an outbreak of human
rhinovirus (HRV), as has also been reported in Sweden and
France [26,27]. A sharp influenza epidemic occurred in October
and November with peak in week 45, following shortly after the
mid-autumn school vacation (week 40, or week 41). The ILI data
suggests high incidence of infection among children and young
adults, while elderly seemed to be spared in the pandemic
(Figure 3A).
The purchases of antivirals in 2009 amounted to 347,900
packages, of which 39,900 packages were bought for children,
231,280 for adults and 76,720 for elderly people. The vast
majority of packages (90%=311,515/347,900) were sold between
week 41 and week 53. On the 5
th of November in the midst of the
epidemic, TamifluH and RelenzaH were made available in
pharmacies without prescription to ensure easy access and to ease
pressure on council health services. This decision led to an
immediate increase in the purchase of antivirals, and on that day
alone 14.9% (51,883/347,900) of the total 2009 sale of antivirals
occurred. While the overall purchase of antivirals seems to follow
the epidemic curve (Figure 3B), more antivirals were used in the
wake of the epidemic compared to the early phase due to the
liberation of prescription policy. No resistance against Oseltamivir
and Zanamir was observed by January 2010 [16].
A nationwide vaccination campaign started in week 43 and
essentially ended in week 51 of 2009 (Figure 3C), although
vaccination continued throughout February 2010. Vaccines were
prioritized to health care workers and defined risk groups, followed
by a general population-wide vaccination campaign starting with
the youngest age groups. The vaccine coverage reached 40% in
the population (1.95 million), with 54% coverage in children (0.50
million), and 35% (1.13 million), and 44% (0.31 million) coverage
in adults and elderly, respectively.
2. Estimation of the Reproductive Number from Data
The fitted growth rates of the ILI curve during the early
epidemic with 95% CI were r~0.06960.055 per day for the
general population, 0.09260.072 per day for children and
0.05960.046 per day for adults and elderly, respectively. Based
on these numbers, we made a rough estimation of the growth-
based reproductive number of the 2009 A(H1N1) epidemic (using
Eq. 1), assuming that chemo-pharmaceutical intervention did not
interfere with the initial general transmission in the population and
that the infectiousness would not vary during the entire infectious
period. The calculation gave an estimated reproductive number of
Figure 2. Influenza-like illness (ILI) rates in Norway between May 2009 and February 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g002
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for higher transmission among children Rc~1.48 (1.09–1.97)
compared to adults Ra~1.29 (1.06–1.57) and elderly Re~1.29
(1.05–1.56). These numbers should be interpreted with care,
however, since the initial spreads in each age group were probably
not auto-nomous.
3. Model Fitting
The age-specific fit of symptomatic infections (Figure 4) showed
good correspondence with the ILI consultations during the major
wave of the pandemic. High transmission levels are seen in
children where the ILI consultations reach half the level of adults,
which is significantly higher than the population ratio between the
two population groups (0.285, based on Norwegian 2010
population data). The fitted relative peak value in children is
slightly lower than suggested by data, and the modeled epidemic in
the adult population tends to decline faster than the observed ILI
curve. This latter finding is not surprising as the model ignores
spatial spread and a longer tail would be expected in practice
compared to a homogeneous model. Table 2 shows the estimated
model parameters (Eq. 2) with residual sum of squares (RSS) for
the three baseline scenarios, where the relative use of antivirals
compared to the number of purchased packages puse is assumed to
be 25%, 37.5% and 50%. The fitted model suggests higher
susceptibility and infectiousness in children with susc around 1.05–
1.06 and infectivity infc around 1.17–1.20 compared to the
remaining population. The reproductive number of the fitted
models was estimated at R~1.37–1.39 in the major pandemic
wave. Parameter estimates for models assuming either puse~25%
or 50% use of purchased antivirals were rather similar, but the best
model fit was obtained assuming puse~50%.
The estimated time from the initial seed of a single infected
individual and until the beginning of week 41 varied from 68–71
days, corresponding to transmission starting in late July.
4. Impact of Vaccine and Antiviral Based Interventions
Tables 3, 4 and Figure 5 show the results from the contrafactual
simulations of the model using the fitted parameter values in
alternative scenarios: 1) with vaccination but without antivirals and
2) assuming an unmitigated pandemic. The model estimates
suggest that vaccination and antiviral intervention reduced the
overall clinical attack rate in the population from 32–33% to 29–
30% (corresponding to an 11–12% reduction of clinical infections).
About 75% of the reduction would have been achieved with
vaccination alone, thereby accounting for the majority of
intervention effects. For the Norwegian population this amounts
to 147 000 prevented clinical infections, 110 000 from vaccination
alone and 37 000 from antiviral use.
The estimated numbers of subclinical infections are in the range
1.05–1.09 million cases, and the number of people who had
experienced infection (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), or
who had been vaccinated amount to 64–65% of the entire
Figure 3. Age-specific Norwegian data on A) influenza-like illness (ILI) , B) purchased antivirals and C) vaccine coverage during the
major pandemic wave between October-January 2009/2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g003
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elderly people with assumed prior immunity, which comprise
approximately 8% of the total population, are not included. The
simulations suggest that the natural peak of the pandemic would
have been close to the observed peak, as the peak occurred
approximately 3 days earlier due to pharmaceutical interventions.
However, the combined effect of vaccines and antivirals lowered
the estimated peak prevalence of symptomatic infections by 9–
10% compared to the unmitigated pandemic. Vaccination alone
would have reduced the peak by 3–4%, only, suggesting that the
release of antivirals in week 45 may have had a significant impact
on the epidemic peak.
5. Sensitivity Analyses
The general impression from the sensitivity analysis is that the
conclusions from the main scenario are quite stable. For simplicity,
all intervals reported below refer to the central 95% of the
distributions of values that were generated using the 500 random
parameter sets as described in Methods, section 6.
The model reproductive number varied within the range of
[1.32, 1.39] assuming 50% effective AV use, within [1.36, 1.40]
for 37.5% AV use and within [1.37, 1.42] for 25% AV use. The
respective means were 1.38, 1.39 and 1.39. The two other fitted
parameters; relative susceptibility and infectivity in children,
varied even less.
For the relative susceptibility, the three means were 1.05, 1.06
and 1.06, respectively, with 95% intervals covering less than
60.03 around the means. For the relative infectivity, the three
means were 1.19, 1.18 and 1.18, respectively, with slightly larger
95% intervals, all less than 60.06 around the mean.
In all 500 parameter sets, the puse~50% assumption lead to a
better fit than the 37.5% and 25% alternatives. The effects on the
simulated scenarios (no intervention, only vaccination, vaccination
and antivirals) and on the related measures of efficacy are also
relatively stable. As an example in the puse~50% scenario, the
clinical attack rate varied within the range of [0.28, 0.33] and the
reduction achieved by vaccination+antivirals within [0.03, 0.05], with
means 0.31 and 0.04, respectively. The total attack rate (including
asymptomatic infections) varied within [0.55, 0.58] and the reduction
in [0.03, 0.07], with means 0.57 and 0.06, respectively. Thus, within
the limits of the performed parameter variations, our main scenario
appears to be rather central, with moderate possible deviations.
Figure 4. Daily age-specific model fit of symptomatic infections to ILI consultations; right panel: children ,15 years, middle panel:
adults and left panel: elderly 65+ years, (p_use=37.5%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g004
Table 2. Estimated model parameters (relative susceptibility
and infectivity in children, and reproductive number), and
residual sum of squares (RSS) obtained using nonlinear least
squares fitting.
Antiviral use
p_use susc infc R RSS h ðÞ
50.0% 1.051 1.207 1.371 1.1721
37.5% 1.058 1.175 1.388 1.1915
25.0% 1.059 1.178 1.392 1.2319
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.t002
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To study the effect of vaccination timing on influenza
transmission, we performed simulations where the vaccination
campaign (that started in week 43) was assumed to commence at
various times between week 27 and week 45. In these simulations
no use of antivirals was incorporated, and the vaccination schedule
was assumed to match the Norwegian data except for the shift in
time. Figure 6 shows the estimated prevalence of symptomatic
influenza cases during the course of pandemic that would have
been observed had vaccination been initiated at different points in
time. Figure 7A shows the relative clinical attack rate compared to
that of an unmitigated pandemic as function of the vaccine start. It
is seen that the additional preventive effect of antivirals could have
been accomplished by adjuvanted vaccines alone, had the
campaign started half a week earlier (black line). Vaccination
should have commenced approximately 6 weeks earlier to achieve
a 50% reduction in the clinical attack rate, and 12.5 weeks earlier
to reduce the attack rate by 75%. Figure 7B depicts the relative
peak prevalence of symptomatic infections compared to the
maximum level of an unmitigated pandemic as function of the
timing of the vaccine start. Vaccination came too late to have any
significant impact on the peak number of infections. If vaccination
had begun one week later, the pandemic would have passed its
natural peak before the vaccines would have started to show effect.
It is seen that a 50% reduction in the peak level would have been
achieved, had vaccination commenced 4.5 weeks earlier than the
actual start. Figure 7C shows the estimated time delay of the
pandemic peak relative to the peak of the unmitigated pandemic
as function of the timing of the vaccine start. It is seen that
vaccination should have commenced at least 8 weeks earlier in
order to delay the peak of the pandemic by half a week, and 10.5
weeks earlier to achieve a peak delay of 8 weeks.
7. Adjuvanted Vaccines Prioritized for Children
We simulated a vaccination campaign using adjuvanted
pandemic vaccines prioritized for children, followed by adults
and elderly (Fig. 7, green lines). The final coverage in the age
groups and daily vaccinations were assumed identical to data. In
Table 3. Estimated age-specific attack rates (symptomatic infections/all infections) during the A(H1N1) pandemic in Norway;
antiviral uptake of 25–50% relative to purchased numbers.
SYMPTOMATIC INFECTIONS ALL INFECTIONS
,15 y 15–64 y 65+y all all ,15 y 15–64 y 65+y all all
p_use intervention % % % % *1e5 % % % % *1e5
50.0% no intervention 47,9 34,1 7,7 32,8 16,0 73,7 62,0 14,1 57,2 27,8
vaccination 45,1 30,8 6,7 30,0 14,6 71,1 56,4 12,3 52,7 25,6
vaccination+antiv. 43,7 29,5 5,9 28,7 14,0 68,8 53,9 11,2 50,5 24,5
37.5% no intervention 47,9 34,5 7,9 33,2 16,1 73,8 62,8 14,3 57,8 28,1
vaccination 45,0 31,2 6,8 30,3 14,7 71,1 57,2 12,5 53,3 25,9
vaccination+antiv. 44,1 30,3 6,3 29,4 14,3 69,6 55,5 11,7 51,8 25,2
25.0% no intervention 48,2 34,7 7,9 33,3 16,2 74,1 63,1 14,4 58,0 28,2
vaccination 45,2 31,3 6,8 30,4 14,8 71,5 57,4 12,6 53,5 26,0
vaccination+antiv. 44,6 30,7 6,4 29,8 14,5 70,4 56,2 12,0 52,4 25,5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.t003
Table 4. Estimated impact of vaccines and antivirals on age-specific total coverage (infection and vaccination) of the A(H1N1)
influenza, and estimated intervention impact on timing and maximum prevalence of symptomatic infections.
COVERAGE PEAK
INFECTIONS/VACCINATIONS SYMPTOMATIC INFECTIONS
use of antivirals intervention ,15 y 15–64 y 65+y all all DT_peak Max I_s Max I_s
p_use % % % % *1e5 days *1e5 %
50.0% no intervention 73,7 62,0 14,1 57,2 27,8 0,0 2,5 100,0
vaccination 84,5 70,7 22,3 66,2 32,2 21,0 2,4 96,6
vaccination+antiv. 83,1 68,9 21,5 64,6 31,4 23,0 2,2 89,9
37.5% no intervention 73,8 62,8 14,3 57,8 28,1 0,0 2,5 100,0
vaccination 84,7 71,3 22,5 66,7 32,4 21,0 2,4 96,6
vaccination+antiv. 83,7 70,2 22,0 65,7 31,9 23,0 2,3 91,5
25.0% no intervention 74,1 63,1 14,4 58,0 28,2 0,0 2,5 100,0
vaccination 84,9 71,8 22,8 67,0 32,6 21,0 2,4 96,5
vaccination+antiv. 84,1 70,7 22,2 66,1 32,1 23,0 2,3 92,4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.t004
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doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g006
Figure 5. Estimated prevalence of clinical infections during the major autumn/winter 2009 pandemic wave (September–January)
for unmitigated pandemic and with pharmaceutical intervention (p_use=37.5%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g005
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vaccination of adults was completed 54 days into the program. A
prioritized vaccination to children starting in week 43 would have
prevented an estimated extra 47,200 symptomatic infections
(1.7%) compared to the adopted vaccination scheme in Norway.
Vaccination should have been initiated 5 and 9.5 weeks earlier to
achieve a 50% or 75% reduction in the attack rate, equivalent to a
gain of one week and 3 weeks, respectively, compared to the
corresponding values calculated using the actual vaccination
strategy (Fig. 7A). Correspondingly, a 50% reduction in the peak
level was predicted to occur, had vaccination started 3.5 weeks
ahead of time, representing a gain of 1 week compared to the
actual vaccination scheme.
8. Non-Adjuvanted Vaccines
Finally, we used the model to explore the mitigating potential of
a non-adjuvanted vaccine adopting a vaccination scheme
equivalent to the actual one (Fig. 7, red lines), and by assuming
a 50% reduction of the vaccination rate (Fig. 7, blue lines) as use of
non-adjuvanted vaccines may not only affect the timing of
vaccination start, but also potentially reduce the rate of vaccine
delivery thereafter. Vaccination with non-adjuvanted vaccines
starting in week 43 would have resulted in an estimated 108,600
additional symptomatic cases (3.9%), while 172,800 extra
symptomatic cases (6.1%) were predicted if the rate of vaccine
delivery is reduced by 50% compared to data. Even a slight delay
in the vaccination start would have reduced the effect of
vaccination to practically nothing. A reduction in the attack rate
of 50% or 75% would have been achieved with a non-adjuvanted
vaccine, if the intervention had started 8 or 15 weeks earlier,
exceeding the estimates for the adjuvanted vaccine by 2–2.5 weeks
(Fig. 7A). In the case of a 50% reduction in vaccine delivery,
vaccination should have commenced 13.5 weeks earlier to achieve
a 50% reduction in the attack rate, equivalent to further 7.5 weeks
compared to the earlier start needed with full delivery of
adjuvanted vaccine.
Discussion
The present study highlights the critical issue of vaccination
timing in relation to pandemic spread. In Norway, vaccination
started too late to have a strong impact on the 2009 A(H1N1)
pandemic. Our results suggest that adjuvanted vaccines in
combination with antivirals lowered the clinical attack rate by an
estimated 11–12% in relative terms (3–4% in absolute terms).
Vaccination was found responsible for approximately 3 in 4
prevented infections. Our study indicates that had vaccination
started 6 weeks earlier, the clinical attack rate would have been
reduced by 50%, while the vaccine effect would have been reduced
to almost nothing, had the intervention started only 2 weeks later.
The vaccination strategy adopted by the Norwegian public
health authorities during the 2009 pandemic was aimed at
protecting risk groups, rather than to affect the overall course of
the epidemic. Our results show elevated transmission among
children, in particular driven by higher infectiousness compared to
Figure 7. The effect of timing of vaccination start on A) pandemic clinical attack rate, B) peak prevalence of symptomatic infections
and C) time delay of peak relative to unmitigated pandemic; no use of antivirals implemented in these simulations (p_use=0%). For
comparison, the predicted relative reduction in the baseline scenario with vaccine and antivirals is shown (delay=0 week) in A and B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030018.g007
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prioritized for children with similar coverage and rate of
vaccination as in the Norwegian data would have been effective
approximately one week earlier compared to the strategy adopted,
when measuring the ability to reduce the overall attack rate by
50%. However, as vaccination began in week 43 in the midst of
the pandemic, the additional benefit from vaccinating children
first would have been limited (1.7% relative reduction). Clearly,
there are ethical aspects to consider in relation to prioritizing
vaccines for children, as reduced transmission comes at the cost of
higher risk of severe disease and death among frail individuals in
the population. Therefore, inclusion of children in the priority
group for vaccination must be weighed against the severity of the
influenza, and may be indicated, for instance in the case of a
potential future pandemic with an avian (H5N1) virus.
Widespread use of adjuvanted influenza vaccines is rather
recent. These vaccines are advantageous compared to conven-
tional vaccines because each vaccine dose contains a smaller
amount of antigen, thereby reducing the vaccine production time.
Compared to the non-adjuvanted vaccines most commonly used
routinely for seasonal influenza, we found that adjuvanted
vaccines were effective approximately 2 weeks earlier, measured
by their capacity to reduce the attack rate by 50%. These results
ignore any potential time delay in the delivery of non-adjuvanted
vaccines, and hence, the mitigating potential of non-adjuvanted
vaccines during the 2009 pandemic in Norway would likely have
been very limited. Norway was among the countries in Europe
with the most liberal policy of administration of antivirals during
the 2009 (H1N1) pandemic. Although our estimates indicate that
antivirals had a minor impact on the spread of influenza, we find
it plausible that the policy change in week 45 allowing
pharmacists the right to distribute antivirals may have contrib-
uted to slowing the transmission in the weeks around the
pandemic peak.
Our model suggest a reproductive number in the early phase of
the major pandemic wave of approximately R~1:37{1:39,
which is close to the estimate of R&1:35 that we obtained using
the initial growth rate of the ILI data. Both estimates are consistent
with a median reproduction number of R~1:5 reported in a
review study [28], and with a previous UK estimate of
approximately R~1:4 [29]. Our results indicate that around
72–73% of the population were either infected or vaccinated
during the course of the major pandemic or possessed an assumed
pre-pandemic immunity against the A(H1N1) virus. Norwegian
serological data from January 2010 showed that 60% of the
population had reactive antibodies against the pandemic virus
[13]. However, the interpretation of the serological data is
complicated and antibody levels are only partly a marker for
immunity, e.g. not taking into account cellular immunity. For
instance, the serological data showed that 28% (95% CI 18–38%)
of people aged 50–64 years had antibodies to the 2009 A (H1N1)
virus, despite a vaccine coverage of 43% in this age group. Thus
the results from our study may be considered as compatible with
the serological results. Our estimate of 1.40–1.45 million clinical
cases is in the higher end of the current official Norwegian
estimate of 0.45–1.8 million symptomatic infections [30], which is
based on assumptions that 5–20% of people with influenza-like
illness contacted the health care system. However, there is
uncertainty surrounding these estimates, and there is a fluent
transition between mild symptomatic and asymptomatic infec-
tion, particularly since the A(H1N1) is considered to have been a
mild pandemic. A recent UK based study assumed that only 35%
of A(H1N1) infections were symptomatic [31]. When re-fitting
our model assuming 45% symptomatic cases among children and
35% symptomatic cases among adults/elderly, we obtained
parameter estimates of R~1:26, susc~1:04 and infc~1:14
(puse~37:5%), with a corresponding clinical attack rate of 1.0
million clinical cases (21%), while 76% of the population were
either infected or vaccinated during the course of the pandemic,
or were naturally immune. The latter estimate is slightly higher
than our baseline estimate of 72% (full data sheet is available
from the authors upon request). One limitation of our study is
that we assumed that the proportion of people with influenza
seeking medical care was age- and time-independent during the
major wave, and this may have biased our estimates of the
relative susceptibility and infectivity in children. It is possible that
the attitude towards seeking GP assistance during the 2009/2010
season was different due to the pandemic scare compared to
normal influenza season. In addition, the Norwegian government
and social partners implemented a common policy on October 23
(week 43) by extending the self-certification period of sickness
absence due to A(H1N1) influenza from 3 to 8 days. However, no
data was available on the attitude towards seeking GP treatment
for influenza, and therefore it was not considered in the model.
Another restriction is the lack of spatial structure in the model,
which may explain the slightly steeper decline in the fitted model
compared to the sentinel ILI data. However, the timing of the
pandemic peak in different regions of Norway varied little and
was of the order of 1 week.
In conclusion our results underscore the critical role of timing of
the vaccination campaign and the importance of fast and efficient
delivery of vaccines. Our results also corroborate previous findings
showing that children played a pivotal role for the spread of the
pandemic.
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